




INSTITUTIONS AND TRADE: COMPETITORS OR 
COMPLEMENTS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT? 
 
Sambit Bhattacharyya 
School of Economics, Finance and Marketing, RMIT University 
Steve Dowrick and Jane Golley  




Paper prepared for DEGIT XII, June 29 – 30, 2007 







A recent paper by Dowrick and Golley (2004) finds that the impact of trade on 
growth varies with income. In particular, during the period 1980-2000, trade is 
observed to yield larger benefits for the more advanced economies. This result is 
backed up by Dejong and Ripoll (2005) who show that the richer countries benefit 
more from tariff reduction than the poorer countries. These findings raise the 
question, what is it about high levels of per capita income that enable richer 
economies to take better advantage of trade? It appears that the reason behind the 
success of the high income economies is the high quality institutions. These 
institutions not only boost growth directly but they impact economic performance 
indirectly by improving trade. We capture the complementarity between institutions 
and trade by estimating an empirical growth model which includes an interactive term 
involving these two variables. Better quality institutions are indicative of lower 
transaction costs which facilitates trade. It also ensures better distribution of the gains 
from trade paving the way for further trade and growth. 
  1INTRODUCTION 
The prime importance of institutions has been argued by Rodrik, Subramanian 
and Trebbi (2004) who show that a measure of the ‘Rule of Law’ dominates the 
influence of both trade and geography as the fundamental determinant of long-run 
economic development.  The title of their paper captures their conclusion: 
‘Institutions Rule’.  Their results build on the findings of the highly influential work 
of Acemolgu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) which demonstrates the strong impact of 
institutions without claiming dominance.  
The conclusion of Rodrik et al. has been challenged by Sachs (2003), who 
presents evidence that geographical conditions conducive to the transmission of 
malaria do have a direct impact on long-run levels of development.   Sachs’s findings 
are backed up by Batten and Martina (2005) who present additional evidence of the 
importance of the disease environment, over and above the influence of institutions, in 
explaining various measures of economic development and well-being.  
A further challenge comes from Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2004) who report that the historical variables use by Rodrik and Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) as instruments to control for the endogeneity of current institutions are also 
highly correlated with current levels of human capital. They argue that the evidence 
on the importance of institutions can also be used to support the ‘human capital’ view 
of the world, in which poor countries accumulate human and physical capital and only 
subsequently improve their institutions.      
In this paper we present evidence to support the views of Glaeser et al.  We go 
further to suggest that the empirical evidence in this debate has been analysed in a 
framework that is theoretically implausible and demonstrably misspecified: a 
framework that we characterise as the ‘levels of development’ approach.  It turns out 
that the empirical level specification is a special case of the growth specification 
which can be distinguished by a straightforward test for an omitted variable.  We 
argue in Section 1 that the growth framework is preferred not only on statistical 
grounds, but also because it more meaningful and relevant.     
In Section 2 we repeat the Rodrik et al. tests for a dominant explanation, but this 
time in a growth framework.  We augment the competition between institutions, trade 
and geography by including a measure of human capital.  We go beyond the ‘horse-
  2race’ set up to explore the suggestion of1, Johnson and Robinson (2005) that there 
may be significant complementarities between commercial and political development.  
Building on recent empirical findings, we investigate the interactions between trade, 
income and institutions. 
 
1.  Which framework – growth or levels? 
The levels framework adopted by Rodrik et al. and other recent papers
1 centers 
on a cross-country regression where the dependent variable is the current level of 
economic development, typically measured by the natural logarithm of real GDP per 
capita, yiT, where i indexes countries and T indicates the year.  The explanatory 
variables consist of a measure of the ‘quality’ of contemporary institutions, IiT, and a 
vector of other explanatory variables, XiT:  
  iT iT iT i yI α ε = +
+ X
β  (1) 
The alternative framework that we propose is to investigate the impact of 
institutions and other determinants of development on the growth rate since some 
initial year t:  ˆii Ti t y yy ≡− .  The growth regression takes the form: 
  ˆii t i T i T yy I i e γ α =+ +
+ X
β  (2) 
where the term  it y , representing log GDP per capita in some initial year t, captures 
the conditional convergence effect typically found in empirical growth models, as 
predicted by both the neo-classical model of Mankiw, Romer and Weil and by models 
of international technology transfer, such as Dowrick and Rogers (2002).   
It is apparent that the levels regression (1) is nested within the growth 
specification, since (2) can be rewritten as: 
  (1 ) iT it iT i i yy I τ e γ α =+ + + +
X
β  (3) 
The null hypothesis, H0: (1+γ) = 0, reduces (3) to the levels regression, whilst 
rejection of the null favours the growth specification. 
The economic intuition behind this test is that the levels regression is implicitly 
explaining the steady state distribution of income levels.  This assumption is explicit 
in the augmented Solow-Swan model derived by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) 
                                                 
1 Examples of papers using the levels approach are Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004), 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001),  Glaeser, La Porta et al. (2004) and Sachs (2003). 
  3who use investment rates as the proximate determinants of the neo-classical steady 
state.  Mankiw et al. go on to show that if economies are not in their steady states, the 
transitional dynamics of the neo-classical model are captured by the addition of the 
‘initial’ income level in a growth regression.
2  If economies actually are in steady-
state, as explained by the right-hand-side variables in equation (1), then the addition 
of the lagged dependent variable, as in equation (3), should add no explanatory power.    
The levels framework has more fundamental problems.  It makes little sense in 
terms of prediction and policy.  For example, in the Rodrik paper the quality of 
institutions is measured by the ‘Rule of Law’ in the year 2000.  The estimated 
coefficient, α, is positive and strongly significant.  The literal interpretation of the 
Rodrik result is that if Bangladesh were to adopt best-practice legal safeguards for 
international investors and to invest in a judiciary and police force to guarantee swift 
enforcement of contracts – thus gaining a top score on the evaluation of Rule of Law 
– then their standard of living would overnight become equivalent to Switzerland’s.   
Well, maybe not overnight.  Perhaps that is being too literal.  But over a year?  
Or a decade? Or a century?   The Rodrik approach is silent on the relevant time-span, 
as is the similar approach adopted by Acemoglu et al. (2001).   
The fundamental problem with the Levels of Development approach is that it 
ignores the process of development.  This failing is obscured by the fact that Rodrik  
et al. follow Acemoglu et al. (2001) in using a plausible historical story to motivate 
the use of an historical variable – the mortality rate amongst European colonial clergy 
and military in the 18
th and 19
th centuries – to act as an instrumental variable in 
estimating the impact of current institutions on the current level of development.    
As Acemoglu tells the story,  Europeans chose to settle in colonies where the 
climate was relatively hospitable, bringing with them traditions and expectations of 
European institutions, particularly in relation to property rights (at least the property 
rights of the settlers).  These expectations were conducive to ‘good’ institutions being 
established and continued throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods.  On the 
other hand, where mortality was high, Europeans would not settle, and the colonial 
authorities would impose authoritarian rule and set up exploitative institutions which 
continued to have an influence through the institutions of post-colonial society.  
This is a plausible story.  It provides an explanation why settler mortality might 
                                                 
2 A similar point has been made previously by Caselli et al and by Sachs (2003). 
  4be correlated with current institutional quality in countries which were subjected to 
European colonisation.  But it is not an explanation for the huge differences that we 
observe in current levels of development.  An instrumental variable is just an 
instrument – satisfying the twin conditions that it is correlated with current institutions 
but uncorrelated with the error term in the levels regression.  The instrument is not an 
explanatory variable.  
In order to demonstrate the importance of institutions for the current level of 
development, one would have to track the development of institutions over the past 
200 years – the period over which the huge differences in GDP per capita have 
developed – and estimate the impact of past, not current, institutional differences on 
growth rates over a succession of sub-periods.   
A further problem with Rodrik’s analysis is that the settler-mortality instrument 
might be just as powerful in identifying some other current variable that is also a 
predictor of current levels of development.  Glaeser et al. (2004) suggest that human 
capital is such a variable.  We confirm Glaeser’s conjecture by replicating Rodrik’s 
levels specification, then substituting current years of schooling (averaged across the 
adult population) for the Rule of Law.   
The results of this experiment are reported in Table 1.  Model 1 is based on 
Rodrik’s, where we observe in an OLS regression that Rule of Law has a positive and 
strongly significant coefficient.  We note, as does Rodrik, that the variable is 
endogenous – the null of exogeneity is rejected at the 0.1% level on the Hausman test 
using Rodrik’s set of instruments – and the subsequent 2SLS estimation results in an 
even higher positive coefficient on Rule of Law with the trade and geography 
variables reduced to statistical insignificance.  So far, so Rodrik. 
Addressing the criticism that the instrumental variables may not identify Rule of 
Law uniquely, we confirm the Glaeser finding that the human capital variable, Years 
of Schooling, is strongly correlated with Settler Mortality and the other instruments – 
see Panel B of Table 1.  In Panel A, we show that Rodrik’s 2SLS result works just as 
well with Years of Schooling in place of Rule of Law.   
 
  5Table 1:  Testing between Levels and Growth Specifications 
Dependent 
variable 
Log Per Capita Income in 2000 
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Panel B: First Stage Regressions        
Dependent 
variable 
Rule of Law (2001) 
obs=68 
Average Log Trade Share 
obs=68 






















































0.7384     
Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a one sided 
alternative. Figures in the parentheses are the respective standard errors. The standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity robust. All the regressions reported above are carried out with an intercept. The 
instruments used for the Hausman test are Log Settler Mortality, ENGFRAC, EURFRAC and CONST 
– see Table 2.   
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In the final columns of Table 1 we report the omitted variable test of the null 
hypothesis that economies in 2000 were in steady-state, hence that the addition of log 
income from a previous period should have no additional explanatory power.  This 
hypothesis is strongly rejected in Model 3 where log income from 1980 has been 
added (with a t-statistic of 18) and in Model 4 where log income from 1900 has been 
added (with a t-statistic of 2.9). These findings are in line with those of Bhattacharyya 
(2004).   
We find strongly in favour of the growth framework over the levels framework.  
The growth approach has the additional virtue of making sense.  A change in current 
institutions relating to the Rule of Law is seen to have an impact on growth rates of a 
magnitude that appears feasible.  Taking the coefficient estimates from Model 3, 
which estimates the growth rate 1980-2000, Bangladesh raising its Rule of Law by 
one unit is predicted to raise real income in 2000 by 29% (e
0.258 = 1.29), 
corresponding to an increase of 1.3 percentage points in the annual growth rate since 
1980.   
By way of contrast, the coefficient of 1.45 in the levels specification in Model 1 
suggests that a unit rise in Rule of Law would quadruple real income in 2000.
3 A 
change in the Rule of Law from its minimum value, -2.5, to its maximum value, 2.5, 
is predicted to increase real income more than one-thousand-fold.   
An interesting point that arises in our estimation of the growth specification is 
that we fail to reject the hypothesis that the Rule of Law is exogenous, whereas in the 
levels specification the hypothesis is rejected strongly – see the Hausman test 
statistics reported in the bottom row of Panel A in Table 1.  Even when we use 1900 
as our measure of initial income, the Hausman test fails to reject the hypothesis of 
exogeneity – see model 4. 
Dollar and Kraay (2003) identify two problems with the levels approach, both 
problems relating to endogeneity through reverse causality and through omitted 
variable bias.  It appears from our results that it is the omission of the initial income 
variable, rather than reverse causation, that leads to the statistical rejection of 
exogeneity in the levels specification. 
                                                 
3 Rodrik et al. (2004) report a coefficient of 1.78 in their preferred specification (3) in their Table 3, 
which suggests that a unit rise in Rule of Law would increase real income sixfold. 
  7The recent flurry of empirical papers estimating the fundamental causes of long-
run development, as captured by current levels of real income, is admirably 
ambitious.  We would like to identify the factors that lead to Switzerland being so rich 
and Bangladesh being so poor.  It appears, however, that ambition has outstretched 
capability.  On both theoretical and statistical grounds we find that the levels 
framework is inadequate for the task.  Variations in current measures of institutional 
quality cannot explain in any sensible manner the centuries of development that have 
led to the current global distribution of income levels.   
In turning to analysis of growth rates we recognise that we are reducing 
substantially the scope of our inquiry.  Lack of historical data, particularly data on 
institutional quality, restricts our analysis to growth over the past twenty years.  But 
we are able to come up with reasonable estimates of the relative impact of trade and 
institutions, and of their interaction, which have meaningful policy implications. 
 
2.  Interactions between institutions and trade 
Rather than treating institutions and trade as competing explanations for 
economic development, we turn to some recent papers which suggest that they may be 
complementary factors. 
A recent paper by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) describes the 
interactive role of trade and institutional development in stimulating economic growth 
in certain Western European countries from the 1500s onwards.  They assert that 
political institutions placing limits and constraints on state power are essential for the 
incentives to undertake investments and for sustained economic growth, and that in 
early modern Europe such political institutions were favoured by commercial interests 
(i.e. economically powerful groups) but not by the monarchies.  Their key hypothesis 
is that in countries with ‘non-absolutist’ initial political institutions (most notably 
Britain and the Netherlands), Atlantic trade and colonial activity enriched and 
strengthened commercial interests groups, which then demanded and obtained 
institutional reforms to protect their property rights, which enabled them to trade and 
invest more, triggering a circular and cumulative pattern of economic growth.   
Two studies suggest that the impact of trade on recent growth is characterised 
by non-linearities and interaction with other economic variables.  Dowrick and Golley 
  8(2004) found that the impact of trade shares (exports plus imports divided by GDP) on 
growth varied with income.  In particular, during the period 1980-2000, trade was 
found to generate substantially greater benefits for the more advanced economies.   A 
subsequent paper by DeJong and Ripoll (2005) investigates the relationship between 
trade barriers and growth, finding that it is contingent on income, with richer 
countries benefiting more from tariff reductions than poorer countries.  To the extent 
that tariff reductions bring about trade expansion, this result is consistent with 
Dowrick and Golley in suggesting that the benefits of  expansion in international trade 
over the past twenty years have accrued disproportionately to the world’s richer 
economies. 
These findings raise the question of what it is about high levels of per capita 
income that enable richer countries to take better advantage of international trade?  
Does a higher level of income imply a higher technological capacity, enabling richer 
countries to benefit more from the technological transfers embodied in modern 
manufacturing trade?  Is a higher level of human capital or physical infrastructure 
required in order for countries to benefit from international trade?  Or does a higher 
level of income go hand-in-hand with ‘higher’ quality institutions, and are these 
institutions essential for trade to impact positively on economic growth?   
Through the use of interactive terms in the econometric analysis, the analysis 
below attempts to provide some insight into these questions. 
 
3.  Estimating complementarity between institutions and trade 
The baseline equation for the analysis in this section is given by: 
1
12 03 4 5 06
0
100*ln( )/20 ln ln
y
yI N S T R Y SL A T
y
α αα α α αε = ++ + + ++        (4) 
where the dependent variable is average annual percentage rate of growth of per 
capita real GDP between 1980 and 2000.  INS is one of four institutional variables: 
investment profile, law and order, corruption and democratic accountability.  Each 
variable is averaged over the period, starting at 1985 which is the earliest year for 
which the data is available. TR is the ratio of trade to GDP, averaged between 1980 
and 2000. Following the example of many papers by Robert Barro, our human capital 
variable, YS, is the average years of schooling amongst the adult population at the 
  9beginning of the period.  LAT is the absolute value of latitude.
4  Table 2 provides the 
summary statistics for these variables.  Data sources are given in the Appendix. 
We use period averages of the institutional variables in order to capture their 
average impact over the two decades.  This procedure has the advantage of smoothing 
out the sometimes substantial fluctuations that have occurred over the period, which 
imply that initial or end values are unlikely to be representative.  For example, the 
correlation between the investment profile in 1985 and subsequent years is 0.69 for 
1990, 0.44 for 1995, and 0.38 for 2000.  The correlation between democratic 
accountability in 1985 and subsequent time periods falls from 0.94 in 1990 to 0.57 in 
2000.  In contrast, the correlation between total years of schooling in 1980 and 1985 
is 0.99, in 1980 and 1990 is still 0.99 and in 1980 and 2000 remains at 0.96.  This 
means that initial levels are a reasonable indicator of levels of schooling over the 
ensuing 20-year period, and the initial level of schooling is a priori exogenous to the 
subsequent rate of growth of real income.   
 
Table 2.   Summary Statistics 
Variable n  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Growth of real GDP per capita (% 
p.a., 1980-200)  117 1.21  1.85  -3.34  5.89 
Initial income ($1996 at PPP) 123  5,795  5,448  547  21,677 
Initial Years of Schooling (years)  95  4.6  2.8  0.4  11.9 
Latitude (absolute value)  123  22.8  16.2  0.23  63.9 
Log Trade Share (%) 
(period average) 
120 4.2  0.6  2.9  5.9 
Institutional Variables (period averages) (INS)
1
Investment Profile (IP)  99  6.5  1.3  3  9.6 
Law and Order (LO)  99  3.6  1.4  1.0  6 
Corruption (CO)  98  3.4  1.3  0.3  6 
Democratic Accountability (DA)  99  3.8  1.3  1.1  6 
1. The institutional variables are taken from the International Country Risk Guide published 
by PRS Group (2005).   
 
 
                                                 
4 Latitude is measured in 2000, ignoring the impact of continental drift over the previous 20 years 
which we rashly assume to be strictly exogenous. 
  10The Investment Profile variable provides an assessment of factors affecting 
risks to investment comprising three subcomponents: contract variability/ 
expropriation, profit repatriation, payment delays.  This captures important elements 
of both contract enforcement and the protection of property rights.  The Law and 
Order variable comprises two subcomponents: the Law subcomponent is an 
assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system and the Order 
subcomponent is an assessment of popular observance of the law.  The Corruption 
variable is an assessment of corruption of the political system.  The Democratic 
Accountability variable is an assessment of the responsiveness of government is to its 
citizens.    
Two points about the ICRG data are worth noting.  First, as pointed out by 
Dollar and Kraay (2003), institutional measures may be subject to ‘halo’ effects, 
meaning that countries with higher income are deemed by assessors to have ‘better’ 
institutions simply because they are observed to be rich.  This suggests that the 
definition of a ‘good’ institution is subjective and may be biased in favour of the 
world’s rich countries, which may in turn lead to over-estimates of the perceived 
benefits of ‘good’ institutions.  Second, in accordance with Glaeser et al. (2004), it is 
worth recognising that these ‘institutional’ measures may in fact be better indicators 
of policy choices during the period of analysis, rather than persistent, ‘deep’ 
measures.  This distinction between institutions and policy is probably less important 
in a growth framework than in the levels framework: what is relevant is how each 
particular variable is found to influence economic growth, and the ensuing policy 
implications. 
Table 3 reports the key results.  Column 1 presents the results for the regression 
using the investment profile as the institutional variable.  Both the investment profile 
and schooling are significant at the 10% level on a one-tailed t-test with the expected 
positive sign.  The pairwise correlation between these variables is 0.68.  They are 
jointly significant at the 5% level, suggesting an important role for both in the growth 
process.  The trade share is statistically insignificant.  Latitude is highly significant 
and positive, consistent with the substantial body of evidence suggesting that tropical 
countries grow slower than countries in temperate zones.   
The results when Law and Order is used as the institutional variable are shown 
in Column 2, which yields very similar result to Column 1.  Law and Order has a 
positive impact on economic growth and, while both it and schooling are only 
  11significant at the 10% level, they are jointly significant at the 1% level.   
 
Table 3.    Baseline OLS Regressions 
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Hausman Test for exogeneity of 











Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a 
one sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are the heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors.  All regressions have an unreported intercept.   
 
Column 3 reports the result for “corruption” as the institutional variable.  The 
ICRG records this variable in such a way that a high score (maximum of 6) represents 
low levels of corruption, so the negative coefficient indicates that an increase in the 
level of corruption stimulates growth.  However, given the high correlation between 
corruption and schooling (0.74), and the fact that these two variables are not jointly 
significant at the 5% level, this result should be treated with caution.  Democratic 
accountability does not have a significant direct impact on economic growth (Column 
4).  From these results it is clear that no single conclusion can be drawn about the 
impact of ‘institutions’ on growth, but instead that different institutions have different 
  12impacts: negative, positive or none at all. 
The bottom row in Table 3 reports the p-values for Hausman test: testing the 
null hypothesis that the trade share and the institutions variable are exogenous.  We 
use as instruments: Hall and Jones’ (1999) fraction of European speakers in the 
population (EURFRAC), Acemoglu et al.’s (2001) log settler mortality and Frankel 
and Romer’s (1999) constructed trade share.  For each institutional variable, we fail to 
reject exogeneity.
5  This result contrasts sharply with the common finding of 
endogeneity in the levels framework.  But to the extent that institutions evolve slowly 
over time, it is not surprising that shocks to the growth rate over twenty years have a 
negligible impact on the institutional measures. 
To capture the idea that the impact of trade might be contingent on the level of 
per capita GDP an interactive term, 7 ln *ln TR y0 α , is added to equation (4).  We find 
that the coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level, as reported in Model 1 
of Table 4.  Partially differentiating with respect to the trade share, TR, gives a point 
estimate of the impact of trade on growth equal to 470 (l n ) /   y TR α α + .  The positive 
coefficient value of  7 α  implies that the marginal impact of trade is increasing with 
income.
6    
The evidence of interaction between trade and income could be the result of 
interactions between trade and other variables that are correlated with income, such as 
human capital and institutional quality.  To address some of these questions, we vary 
the interactive term.  In Model 2, the trade share is interacted with the initial value of 
the institutions variable (  ).  The purpose of this term is to investigate 
whether ‘better’ institutional measures – i.e. higher investment profiles, more law and 
order and democratic accountability, less corruption – bring about greater gains from 
trade (
0 ln * TR INS
7 α >0) or not ( 7 α <0).  Model 3 interacts the trade share with initial schooling 
( ), which may shed light on whether the impact of trade on growth varies 
according to levels of human capital.  Table 4 presents results for these alternative 
specifications using the Investment Profile as the measure of institutional quality.   
0 ln * TR YS
                                                 
5 These regressions were also run using average rather than initial total years of schooling.  This means 
that there are three potentially endogenous variables and the Hausman test is constructed accordingly.  
In each case, the null hypothesis of exogeneity still cannot be rejected. 
6 Given that we estimate  4  α to be negative, there will be some levels of income ( 04 ln y 7 α α <− ) 
for which the marginal impact of trade on growth is predicted to be negative.  However we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the marginal impact of trade is positive for all observations in our sample. 
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Table 4.   Trade, Investment Profile, Human Capital and Growth 
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Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a one sided 
alternative. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors.  All the regressions have an intercept.      
 
In Model 2, where the trade share is interacted with the initial investment 
profile, the coefficient on the interactive term is positive and significant at the ten 
percent level.  While the investment profile variable has become insignificant, it is 
jointly significant with the interactive term at the 5% level.  These results have two 
implications: the benefits of trade accrue disproportionately to countries with better 
investment profiles, and the benefits of a good investment climate are magnified if a 
country engages in more international trade. It appears that trade policy and 
investment policy are complementary in promoting economic growth.     
Model 3 interacts trade and initial schooling.  The coefficient on the interactive 
term is positive and significant at the 5% level, implying that a higher level of 
education enables countries to benefit more from trade, and vice versa.  
Table 5 summarises the coefficient estimates for the interactive terms using the 
  14alternative institutional variables.  The results for Model 1 are very similar regardless 
of which institutional variable is used: in all cases  7 α is positive and significant at the 
1% level.   In Model 3 while the interactive schooling term is positive in all cases, it is 
only significant in two, perhaps suggesting a lack of robustness for this result. 
 
Table 5.   Interactions with each of the institutional variables 
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Note: The specifications of these regressions follow those in Table 4.  Here we report only the 
coefficient estimate and robust standard error for the interactive terms.    
 
Most interesting are the results for Model 2, which vary depending on the 
choice of institutional variable.  When democratic accountability is used, the 
interactive term is again positive and significant, suggesting that higher democratic 
accountability brings greater benefits from trade.  In contrast, the interactions between 
trade and law and order and trade and corruption are insignificant. 
It is of interest to investigate the magnitude of the interactive component of the 
marginal impact of institutions.  For the investment profile, the marginal impact on 
growth is  .  Thus, for a country with a trade share averaging 67 percent 
of GDP, corresponding to a log trade share of 4.2, a one point increase in the initial 
investment profile would increase the growth rate of per capita GDP by 0.30 
percentage points.  Likewise, the marginal impact of democratic accountability is 
given by  , implying that a one point increase in democratic 
accountability in 1980 was associated with an additional 0.60 percentage points of per 
capita GDP growth.  If these results are in anyway indicative of what lies ahead, the 
news is possibly good for many.  For example, Bolivia had an investment profile in 
1985 of 2.3, which had increased to 9.9 by 2000.  Over that same period Chile’s 
0.071*lnTR
0.143*lnTR
  15increased from 3.5 to 9.6, Costa Rica’s from 4.9 to 9.8, Ethiopia’s from 1.3 to 8.8, 
Greece from 4.7 to 10.3 and even the United Kingdom from 7.8 to 11.1.  Combine 
these kind of increases with measures to improve democratic accountability (from 
lows of 1.0 in Guinea Bissau and Ethiopia, for example, to the maximum value of 6 
achieved by Australia, Canada, Ireland and Korea, among others) and the potential 
gains in terms of economic growth start to look quite sizeable. 
The finding that a country’s investment profile and democratic accountability 
are important for economic growth at least partly because of their impact via trade 
suggests that Acemoglu et al.’s (2005) hypothesis regarding trade-induced 
institutional development and economic growth may be just as valid in the modern 
context as they have found it to be historically.  It could be argued that in the last 
twenty years, countries with weak democratic accountability – in place of relatively 
‘absolutist’ institutions – have failed to reap the benefits of international trade because 
their governments have prevented the rise of economically powerful groups, which in 
turn has retarded institutional development and hence economic growth.  In contrast, 
countries with high levels of democratic accountability have benefited substantially 
from international trade, partly because strengthened commercial groups have been 
able to lobby successfully for economic policies and institutional developments that 
protect investors’ rights (as embodied in the ‘investment profile, for example), 
thereby encouraging further trade expansion and economic growth. 
 
4.  Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis 
We perform a series of sensitivity and robustness tests. First, we test the 
robustness of our results to changes in the sample of countries. We omit groups of 
countries that may have characteristics different from the rest of the sample to see 
if this influences our results. It may be the case that our results on interactive 
effects of trade are driven by a group of countries with peculiar characteristics that 
have nothing to do with trade or interactive effects of trade. Second, we test the 
impact of individual influential observations on our results by omitting them from 
the sample. We use the statistical procedures outlined in Belsley et al. (1980) to 
track the influential observations.  
      In Table 6 we report the coefficient estimates on the trade share and the 
trade share interacted with initial investment profile when our preferred 
  16specification, as reported as Model 2 in Table 4, is estimated using different sub-
samples. Omitting African countries from the sample yields an estimate on trade 
share that is marginally different in terms of magnitude but becomes statistically 
significant at the 5% level. No significant change is observed on the coefficient 
estimate of the interactive term. Eliminating Asia or the Americas from the sample 
makes the coefficients statistically insignificant. Omitting Neo Europe from the 
sample does not have significant impact on the coefficient estimates. We repeat 
these tests for law and order, corruption and democratic accountability (not 
reported here) and find that our results are robust for these variables as well.   
   
Table6.   Robustness to sub-samples and omitted observations (OLS estimates).  
The Dependent variable is Growth 1980-2000 






















































































Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a 
one sided alternative. The first column reports coefficient on average log trade share and the 
second column reports coefficient on the interactive term with investment profile in 1985. T-
ratios are reported in parentheses. In each of the sub-samples countries from Africa, Asia, 
Europe, the Americas, and neo European countries (Canada, US, Australia) are eliminated. 
The sample size (N) and R
2 in each case are also reported. Influential variables are omitted 
using the following standard rules. DFITS: Omit if   (Belsley et al. 
(1980)). Cook’s distance: Omit if Cook’s distance > 4/n.  
1/2 2( / ) i DFITS k n >
 
      We report outlier sensitivity tests using Belsley et al. (1980)’s distance 
  17from fitted value measure (DFITS) and Cook’s distance measure. In case of the 
former we omit the observation if   and in case of the latter 
omission occurs if Cook’s distance > 4/n. It appears that our estimates remain 
robust to omissions of influential observations. This leads us to conclude that our 
estimates are largely robust across different sub-samples. However, we get weaker 
estimates (statistically insignificant) in sub-samples in case of investment profile 
when we leave out Asia or the Americas. 
1/2 2( / ) i DFITS k n >
 
5.  Concluding comments 
In this paper we show that the existing research strategy used to establish 
institutions as the fundamental cause of economic development is flawed and 
suffers from serious problems of omitted variable and identification when current 
levels of development are regressed on current values of institutional quality.   
Rodrik et al. (2004) set up a three variable model with institutions, geography 
and trade in order to explain the fundamental cause of differences in levels of 
income across world economies. They estimate this model using IV approach and 
find that institutions are the sole explanator of differences in income levels. They 
choose IV over OLS because they argue that OLS suffers from endogeneity 
problem and produces biased estimates largely due to the presence of reverse 
causality. We use the Hausman test and find that the source of bias is in fact the 
omitted variable log initial income and not reverse causality. This result appears to 
be robust to the choice of time scale. We go back as far as 1900 and observe that 
the endogeneity bias gets eliminated once we control for log initial income.   
This leads us to two conclusions. The first is important but somewhat routine. 
The OLS estimates of this model when log initial income is present as a control is 
unbiased which confirms that the growth specification is superior to the levels 
model proposed by Rodrik et al. (2004) and Acemoglu et al. (2001).  
The second conclusion is more interesting and has far reaching implications. 
Our study like others in the literature recognizes the importance of history. 
However, we significantly differ from the existing levels literature in our handling 
of history. The levels literature focuses on a much more ambitious objective of 
  18explaining the historical process of development. They use historical variables to 
predict current institutions and use these predicted values to show the role of 
history.  In contrast we focus more on more humble objective of explaining the 
dynamics of income in the last 20 years and we use history as an additional control 
incorporated in the initial income term. Even though the levels strategists claim that 
they have managed to establish the link between history and current development, 
we show that their estimates are biased. Even in the best case scenario their analysis 
cannot rule out the correlation between initial income and geography variables 
which biases the coefficients. We solve this problem by controlling for initial 
income, at the expense of a more restricted analysis. 
The levels framework also suffers from identification problems. As Glaeser et 
al. (2004) reports and we confirm in our study, the instruments used for linking 
history with current institutions are as good predictor of current human capital as it 
is of current institutions. We build on Glaeser’s critique and redo the Rodrik type 
experiment using human capital instead of institutions. Our results expose a serious 
weakness in the levels framework and leads us to conclude that the levels strategy 
fails to identify the prime role of institutions.             
In our analysis we observe that ‘institutions don’t rule’.  Rather, we find that 
trade, geography, human capital all combine to determine economic growth.   
Moreover, we find evidence of complementarity between institutions and trade.  
We observe that these results depend on which measures of institutional quality 
are used.  The institutional variables that have the most significant impact on growth 
are a country’s Investment Profile and its Democratic Accountability (as assessed by 
the ICRG) and these impacts are found to be complementary with the share of trade in 
GDP.  Our analysis of the recent growth data provides support for the hypothesis 
advanced by Acemoglu et al. (2003) of interactions between trade and political factors 
in the historical development of the Western European nations. 
The policy implication of these results is that trade policies alone will bring 
little benefit if appropriate institutions are not put in place. Correcting institutions 
without adopting appropriate trade policy, on the other hand, is more likely to end up 
as a disappointing failure. Therefore, as a policy maker, one needs to formulate 
appropriate policies which can tap these complementarities. The levels literature 
argues that bad economic policies are only symptoms of weaknesses in longer-run 
institutional factors, and correcting the economic policies without correcting the 
  19political institutions will bring little long-run benefit. In other words, they argue that 
economic policies should go hand in hand with political reforms. Our analysis 
explores further along these lines and identifies some of the areas where there is a 
potential for reforms. The two major policy lessons that we learn out of this exercise 
are as follows. First, maximum benefit can be drawn from trade liberalization if 
countries adopt economic policies and political structure that corrects disincentive for 
investments, ensures enforcement of contracts and prevents payment delays. Second, 
putting democratic accountability in place and making the policy makers and the law 
makers accountable to the population at large increases the likelihood of a fair 
distribution of the gains from trade making the process of trade induced growth 
sustainable.  
We acknowledge the caveats that one should not get too carried away with a 
failure to reject a null or a positive coefficient estimate in cross country regressions. 
However, these results do give us a direction for future research if we want to look at 
within country variations. It also says a fair bit about the importance of political 
economy even when we are trying to explain across country variations. If this is a 
beginning of telling a story on institutions and trade then we would expect more 
future research devoted to exploring the interrelationship between them and economic 
development. This perhaps will bring back political economy at the forefront of all 
debates on development. 
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  21Data Appendix
Variable name  Description  Source 
Growth (1980-
2000) 
Calculated for 128 countries using annualised growth rate formula with 
GDP per capita PPP figures (1980-2000).   
Penn World Table 
(PWT) 6.1 
Heston et al. (2002) 
Log Per capita 
GDP in 2000   
Natural log of real GDP per capita in 2000. Real GDP figures are 
measured in US $ in current prices and the figures are PPP converted.  
Penn World Table 
(PWT) 6.1 
Heston et al. (2002) 
Initial Income 
(1900)   




(1960)   
Initial Level of per capita GDP (1960) in natural logs and PPP figures.  Penn World Table 
(PWT) 6.1 
Heston et al. (2002) 
Log of Trade Share  Log Trade share (period average) is the average of log trade share over 
the period 1980-2000. trade share is calculated by dividing the volume of 
trade with GDP.  
Penn World Table 
(PWT) 6.1 
Heston et al. (2002) 
Years of schooling  
(TYR) 
Average schooling years in the total population in 1980.  Barro and Lee (1993) 
Latitude (LAT)  Absolute Latitude  Hall and Jones (1999) 
Rule of Law  Rule of Law index of 2002 varying between -2.5 and +2.5. Higher value 
corresponds to better institutional quality 




This is an assessment of factors affecting the risk to investment that are 
not covered by other political, economic and financial risk components. 
The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents, each with a 
maximum score of 4 and a minimum score of 0 points: contract 
variability/ expropriation, profit repatriation, payment delays. A score of 
4 equates to a very low risk and a score of 0 equates to a very high risk.  





Law and Order are assessed separately. The Law subcomponent is an 
assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system and the 
Order subcomponent is an assessment of popular observance of the law. 
The assessment is made on a six point scale with a high score implying 
better law and order. 




This is an assessment of corruption within the political system. The 
assessment is made on a six point scale with a high score implying less 
corruption.  
PRS Group (2005) 
ICRG  
Variable name  Description  Source 
DA (period 
average) 
This is a measure of how responsive the government is to its people. The 
maximum point of 6 is assigned to alternating democracies, while the 
minimum point of 0 is assigned to autarchies.   




Natural log of  estimated European Settler Mortality Rate in colonies and 
settlements 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
 
ENGFRAC  It is one of the "first" language variables, corresponding to the fraction of 
the population speaking English 
Hall and Jones (1999) 
EURFRAC  It is one of the "first" language variables, corresponding to the fraction of 
the population speaking one of the major languages of Western Europe: 
English, French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish. 
Hall and Jones (1999) 
Log population 
Density in 1500 
Natural log of total population divided by total arable land in 1500 A.D. 
Source: McEvedy and Jones (1978) as cited in Acemoglu, et al. (2002). 




Natural log of constructed openness calculated by filtering actual trade 
share from the influence of geographic factors using a bilateral trade 
equation which is also known as the gravity model. 
Frankel and Romer 
(1999) 
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